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Abstract 
The performance of natural behaviour is commonly used as a criterion in the 
determination of animal welfare. This is still true, despite many authors having 
demonstrated that it is not a necessary component of welfare – some natural behaviours 
may decrease welfare, while some unnatural behaviours increase it. Here I analyse why 
this idea persists, and what effects it may have. I argue that the disagreement underlying 
this debate on natural behaviour is not one about what conditions affect welfare, but a 
deeper conceptual disagreement about what the state of welfare actually consists of. 
Those advocating natural behaviour typically take a ‘teleological’ view of welfare, in 
which naturalness is fundamental to welfare, while opponents to the criterion usually 
take a ‘subjective’ welfare concept, in which welfare consists of the subjective 
experience of life by the animal. I argue that as natural functioning is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for understanding welfare, we should move away from the natural 
behaviour criterion to an alternative such as behavioural preferences or enjoyment. This 
will have effects in the way we understand and measure welfare, and particularly in 
how we provide for the welfare of animals in a captive setting. 
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1. Introduction 
Providing for the welfare of captive animals consists largely of understanding what 
factors contribute to, or detract from, the welfare of these animals. These factors are the 
conditions for welfare; those things that make the lives of animals better or worse. 
These include factors such as diet, shelter, health, and behavioural opportunities. To 
this end, there are animal welfare frameworks in place that function to list the important 
conditions for animal welfare, allowing best practice in animal husbandry. Possibly the 
most commonly used framework is that of the Five Freedoms (Farm Animal Welfare 
Council, 1979). Others include the ‘Five Domains’ (Mellor, 2016), Dawkins’ ‘Two 
Questions’ (Dawkins, 2003) and the Welfare Quality® assessment system (e.g. 
Botreau, Veissier, & Perny, 2009). All of these list conditions they think are crucial to 
creating and maintaining good welfare; however, although there is substantial overlap 
of many components, there is not always agreement as to which criteria should be used 
within these lists. 
One of the most contested criteria for animal welfare is that of natural behaviour – 
that allowing an animal to perform natural behaviours is beneficial to welfare. Within 
animal husbandry professions, particularly the zoo industry, there is often a strong 
feeling that promoting natural behaviours is of benefit to the animals. However, there 
are also strong reasons for thinking this criterion does not do well at capturing exactly 
why particular behaviours are important for welfare – that is, how they matter to the 
animal (see discussion in, for example, Dawkins, 1980; Mellor, 2015; Špinka, 2006; 
and Veasey, Waran, & Young, 1996b, 1996a). Most importantly, it seems like natural 
behaviour lacks a necessary connection to welfare - many natural behaviours will be 
detrimental to welfare, while some unnatural behaviours can be beneficial. 
In this paper, I will begin in Section 2 by outlining the debate on natural behaviour, 
and the use of the natural behaviour criterion, as well as some alternatives that have 
been proposed. I will then move on in Section 3 to diagnose the disagreement not at the 
level of which conditions are thought to affect welfare, but at a deeper conceptual level 
of understanding of the state of welfare itself and what it consists of – a ‘teleological’ 
understanding of welfare as opposed to a ‘subjective’ understanding. Finally, in Section 
4 I will argue that natural functioning fails to be either necessary or sufficient for 
welfare, and so we should reject the teleological welfare concept and the natural 
behaviour criterion that rests on it, in favour of an alternative like behavioural 
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preferences or enjoyment. I will then describe some of the effects a change like this 
might have in the way we understand and measure welfare, and particularly in how we 
provide for the welfare of animals in a captive setting. 
 
2. The ‘natural behaviour’ debate 
2.1 Use of the natural behaviour criterion 
The criterion of natural behaviour is one of the most controversial proposed 
conditions for animal welfare. It is the idea that the performance of natural, or species-
typical, behaviour leads to increased welfare, and its non-performance is detrimental to 
welfare. Within animal husbandry practice and research, most prominently within the 
zoo industry, natural behaviour is often considered as an essential component of 
welfare. The assumption of natural behaviour as necessary for welfare of captive exotic 
animals is common throughout the literature (e.g. Clubb & Mason, 2007; Gray, 2017; 
Hill & Broom, 2009; Maple & Perdue, 2013). Assessments of zoo animal welfare often 
rely on comparisons with wild activity budgets (see examples in Howell & Cheyne, 
2019), where “deviations from wild-type behaviours are assumed to indicate a 
reduction in welfare” (Howell & Cheyne, 2019, p. 79). Most environmental enrichment 
efforts for captive zoo animals are used in an attempt to increase the performance of 
natural behaviours, without further thought as to whether these are the best way to 
increase welfare.1 Many zoos emphasise “the ability of each animal to perform his or 
her species-typical behaviour” (Koene, 2013, p. 361). Maple et al. (1995) claim, “the 
exhibition of species-typical behaviour should be the goal of all zoo husbandry 
programs” (1995, p. 225). Many authors consider performance of natural behaviour to 
be a key indicator of animal welfare (see examples in Duncan and Fraser, 1997), where 
the lack of natural behaviours is seen as a sign of problematic welfare. Use of this 
criterion is also common in philosophical discussions of animal welfare (e.g. 
Nussbaum, 2004; Rollin, 2006). 
The natural behaviour criterion also appears in some versions of the ‘Five Freedoms’ 
framework, a set of criteria that are considered to be central components determining 
animal welfare and which compose one of the earliest frameworks for animal welfare. 
 
1 There can be additional reasons aside from welfare to prefer natural behaviour for zoo animals – the 
maintenance of wild behaviours in animals that may be released, as well as the educational benefits to 
(and aesthetic preferences of) the viewing public – but most often they are emphasised for welfare 
reasons 
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The Freedoms lay out a set of guidelines for ensuring animal welfare and include the 
“freedom to express normal behaviour” (Farm Animal Welfare Council, 1979). This 
criterion is used in two different ways. The first, and the one that is relevant to this 
paper, is referring to natural behaviour. This is either through rephrasing as ‘freedom 
to express natural behaviour’ (e.g. SPCA NZ, n.d.-b) or as understanding normal 
behaviour to mean natural or species-typical behaviour: “a normal behaviour is the way 
an animal acts in its natural environment” (SPCA NZ, n.d.-a); “normal behaviour is 
based, in part, on the evolution of animal behaviour in the natural environment of the 
progenitor species” (Farm Animal Welfare Council, 2009, p. 12). This usage is 
particularly common within the husbandry of exotic animals. The second, more 
common, usage retains the form ‘freedom to express normal behaviour’ and takes this 
to mean something less strong than natural, such as those behaviours commonly 
performed by the individual animals within their particular circumstances (e.g. 
domestication). In those cases where normal behaviour is used without any intended 
connection to natural or species-typical behaviour, the concerns outlined in this paper 
will not apply, though there may still be other reasons to prefer one of the other accounts 
described, which more closely tie the importance of a behaviour to its effects on the 
animal.  
With the criterion of natural behaviour still in common use, there is a problem if it 
turns out not to actually be linked with animal welfare – with the wrong targets for 
improving welfare, there is the risk of wasting resources that could be used in other 
areas with greater effect. In the next section, I will look at some reasons why we should 
think that this criterion does not do well in capturing a condition for animal welfare. 
 
2.2 Problems with the natural behaviour criterion 
Despite its prevalent use, there are several problems with the natural behaviour 
criterion as have been widely pointed out by, for example, Dawkins (1980), Veasey et 
al. (1996b, 1996a), Špinka (2006) and Mellor (2015). The primary reason the criterion 
of natural behaviour is inadequate is that natural behaviour does not hold any necessary 
connection to welfare. By contrast, the components described by other common criteria, 
such as nutrition or health status, do appear to hold such a connection – an animal is 
going to suffer without sufficient food, or when in pain. As it stands, this criterion relies 
on the assumption that an animal will suffer if unable to perform any of its natural 
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behaviours, and presumably if performing any unnatural behaviours. However, there 
is no reason to think that this is the case. 
There are natural behaviours that potentially reduce welfare – those behaviours that 
reflect the struggle to merely survive, but may be experienced as unpleasant, such as 
predator-avoidance and fighting behaviour (Mellor, 2015). Providing captive animals 
opportunities to perform these behaviours in environments where these challenges no 
longer exist is unlikely to enhance their welfare; in fact welfare is more likely to 
decrease due to the associated fear and distress, and potential physical injury (Mellor, 
2015). One example of the mistaken reliance on natural behaviour is in the husbandry 
of captive tigers. As the natural social behaviour of wild tigers is to live a largely 
solitary life, most zoos hold tigers on their own. However, captive tigers appear to do 
better when housed in pairs than singly, as indicated by voluntary performance of a 
range of prosocial behaviours (De Rouck, Kitchener, Law, & Nelissen, 2005), As such 
the focus on replicating the natural behaviour decreases rather than improves their 
welfare. 
There are also unnatural behaviours that do not negatively affect welfare – for 
example, recent work with orangutan enrichment has provided them with computer 
gaming devices and they seem to derive great benefit, in terms of cognitive stimulation, 
from interacting with these (Perdue, Clay, Gaalema, Maple, & Stoinski, 2012). Animal-
computer interaction is an emerging field that looks to provide welfare benefits for 
animals through decidedly unnatural means (see e.g. Mancini, 2011; Rault, Webber, & 
Carter, 2015). Despite being far from natural, these behaviours are improving animal 
welfare. 
All this means that there is no reason to think that it is the ‘naturalness’ of the 
behaviour that is linking it to welfare, as opposed to some other aspect of the behaviour. 
It is these other relevant aspects that we should be targeting, as will be discussed shortly. 
Dawkins (1983) points out that a behaviour being performed by a wild member of the 
species is insufficient to predict that an animal may enjoy performing this behaviour or 
suffer in its absence – the naturalness does not directly link to the welfare effect. 
Although natural behaviours may often be beneficial to an animal’s welfare, they are 
not necessarily so. Where they are beneficial, they are so in virtue of some other factor, 
and this should form the substance of the relevant welfare criterion. 
 
2.3 Alternative criteria 
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Many writers, noting these problems with the account of natural behaviour, have 
proposed alternative criteria that could be used in considering the behavioural 
requirements of welfare (e.g. Dawkins, 1983, 1988, 1990; Webster, 2016; Hughes & 
Duncan, 1988; Jensen & Toates, 1993). These responses usually revolve around some 
concept of behavioural needs, drawing a parallel with the physical needs of animals – 
as an animal has a need for food or water, so too it has a ‘need’ to perform certain 
behaviours. In terms of animal welfare, the further assumption would be that as an 
animal may suffer when deprived of a physical need, so too would it suffer comparably 
if deprived of a behavioural ‘need’. Much of the writing since then about the links 
between behaviour and welfare has been in search of a description of what behavioural 
needs might consist of, and how we might recognise them.2 These responses all look 
for ways in which we may identify which behaviours are important to the animals that 
perform them, giving that extra relevant factor which actually influences welfare, over 
and above naturalness.  
The first, and probably most popular account, is that of behavioural preferences (e.g. 
Dawkins, 1983, 1990, 2003). Dawkins’ (2003) ‘two questions’ framework simply sets 
out the two questions ‘is the animal physically healthy?’ and ‘does the animal have 
what it wants?’ as sufficient for determining welfare. This type of account gives 
primacy to the preferences of the animals in determining which behaviours are 
important to welfare. These are the behaviours that an animal wants to perform, that it 
will choose under testing and will work for the opportunity to perform. The 
performance of such behaviours is correlated with positive mental states, while their 
continued frustration creates negative mental states detrimental to welfare. This type of 
account has the added advantage of allowing for individual differences between 
members of a species. Growing research in animal personalities has demonstrated 
personality differences between animals (e.g. Gartner & Weiss, 2018) and these 
differences are likely to impact individual welfare in ways that a natural behaviour 
perspective, with its emphasis on species norms, cannot account for3. 
Even Webster, one of the original authors of the Five Freedoms account now thinks 
‘freedom of choice’ would be a better behavioural criterion for capturing the important 
aspects of behaviour relative to welfare – the ability of an animal to choose those 
 
2 See Swaisgood (2007) for a useful summary of theories about the relationship between behaviour and 
welfare in this sense 
3 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
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behaviours it prefers, or that create positive experiences (Webster, 2016). Other similar 
accounts include behavioural motivation (e.g. Hughes & Duncan, 1988) and 
behavioural goals (e.g. Jensen & Toates, 1993). Mellor’s (2016) Five Domains model 
prioritises those behaviours that are enjoyable, or create positive mental states. 
Similarly, Howell & Cheyne (2019) recommend “a desirable behavioural profile … 
indicative of a positive emotional state” (2019, p. 89). In all of these accounts what is 
emphasised is the importance of making a direct link from behaviour to welfare through 
what has an effect on the animal, where the resulting behaviours might sometimes be 
natural and sometimes not. 
Despite the convincing work described in demonstrating the inadequacy of the 
natural behaviour criterion, and the proposal of suitable alternatives, this criterion is 
still in common use throughout animal welfare and husbandry organisations, and this 
continued use stands in need of explanation. This may simply be a case of theory 
moving ahead of practice – such as the philosophical literature not having been made 
accessible to those who work in the field – and perhaps practice would change if 
awareness were raised. However, it has been decades since some of this literature was 
released, without significant change. This suggests the problem runs deeper. 
In the following section I will describe what I think is motivating this difference in 
perspective. Those who advocate natural behaviour appear to be using a ‘teleological’ 
conception of welfare, in which naturalness is considered fundamental to welfare, 
outside of its effects in other areas. Others are instead considering animal welfare from 
a subjective standpoint – that is, consisting of the positive experience of life by the 
animal, and where only those factors that affect this experience are important in 
determining welfare. I will present reasons for rejecting the teleological view, and 
therefore for rejecting the criterion of natural behaviour in favour of something like 
behavioural preferences or enjoyment. 
 
3. Two conceptions of welfare 
The debate about natural behaviour then seems to be at its heart, a debate about what 
animal welfare really is. Thinking about animal welfare can occur on different levels. 
There is a more pragmatic standpoint, in which we are thinking about how we can 
improve animal welfare, about how we make lives better for our animals. This is based 
in consideration of the conditions for welfare, as I described earlier – those things such 
as diet, shelter or behavioural opportunities. These conditions play a causal role in 
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improving or decreasing welfare. But we can also think about welfare from a more 
conceptual perspective. We can think about of how we define the underlying state of 
welfare - what it is we are even talking about when we speak of welfare. This is the 
state onto which all other welfare considerations collapse – they will be considered as 
contributing to welfare only in virtue of their contribution to this state. The conditions 
for welfare are then those things which cause changes in this underlying state.  
On its surface, the natural behaviour debate appears to be conducted over whether 
natural behaviour should be accepted as a condition for welfare. That is, whether or not 
allowing an animal to perform natural behaviours will lead to an increase in welfare, in 
the same way that changes in diet or housing might. However, I believe the debate 
really lies on the deeper conceptual level concerning how we define the state of welfare 
itself – what Fraser et al. (1997) refers to as reflecting the “value-laden presuppositions 
about what is better or worse for animals” (1997, p. 188). This is a similar distinction 
to one made by Appleby & Sandøe (2002) between the two questions “ ‘How should 
well-being or welfare be defined?’ and ‘How should well-being or welfare be 
assessed?’ ” (2002, p. 285); what has often appeared be a disagreement over the latter 
is actually a disagreement over the former. 
Mellor (2016) points out that there are still multiple ways of understanding welfare 
– “during the 30 years since animal welfare emerged as a legitimate area of scientific 
study no universally endorsed definition of it has emerged” (2016, p. 14). These 
different conceptions of welfare can lead to different outcomes – for example, Croney 
& Millman (2007) describe a disagreement on the use of sow stalls between those 
holding different welfare concepts; in this case the different concepts in play led to 
either endorsement or rejection of the use of such stalls. It is then clearly important to 
have the right welfare concept in mind in order to make relevant welfare decisions.  
Use of the natural behaviour criterion often rests on what I will call a ‘teleological’ 
conception of animal welfare that takes something like the natural flourishing of an 
animal to be central to its wellbeing. For example, the Farm Animal Welfare council 
states that “an animal should be kept in an environment within which its species has 
evolved and with respect for its nature, or telos” (Farm Animal Welfare Council, 2009, 
p. 12). By contrast, the ‘subjective’ conception describes the experience of life by the 
animal as grounding the state of welfare. 
The teleological conception of welfare takes welfare to consist of the overall 
‘flourishing’ of an animal – that is, being ‘good of its kind’ and functioning as it was 
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‘designed’ by natural selection. These accounts all take this sort of natural functioning 
as fundamental to the welfare of animals. Rollin (2006) describes the ‘telos’ of an 
animal as “a nature that sets it apart from other things . . . defined by the functions and 
aims (not necessarily conscious aims) of the creature” (2006, p. 118). He says that 
“animals [have] a right to live their lives in accordance with their physical, behavioural, 
and psychological interests that have been programmed into them in the course of their 
evolutionary development and that constitute their telos” (2006, p. 301), centreing the 
importance of naturalness to welfare. Fraser (1999) also focuses on the concept of telos, 
considering it to simply mean that “animals should be allowed to live in a manner for 
which they are adapted, and to have the type of ontogenic development that is normal 
for the species” (1999, p. 177). Nussbaum (2004) stresses that “it is good for that being 
to flourish as the kind of thing it is” (2004, p. 306).  
Other authors take the concept of welfare to have several parts, but still containing 
a teleological component: “Animal welfare is best understood as the promotion of 
physiological, psychological, and species-specific functioning” (Jones, 2013, p. 18); 
“that animals should feel well by being free from prolonged or intense fear, pain and 
other unpleasant states, and by experiencing normal pleasures; that animals should 
function well in the sense of satisfactory health, growth and normal behavioural and 
physiological functioning; and that animals should lead natural lives through the 
development and use of their natural adaptations” (Fraser, 1999, p. 178, italics in 
original). This sort of multi-component welfare concept, inclusive of teleological 
welfare, is probably currently the most commonly used concept (see e.g. Mellor, 2016, 
“three orientations”; Maple & Perdue, 2013, as well as others referenced here). 
As well as being common in the literature, the teleological conception seems to most 
closely track the intuitions of the general public on issues of welfare – both Lassen et 
al. (2006) and Vanhonacker et al. (2008) found that citizens were more likely than 
animal husbandry professionals to consider natural behaviour or living a natural life as 
central to welfare. It is also often a key part of opposition to keeping animals in 
captivity. See for example, Jamieson (1985) – “it is surely true that in being taken from 
the wild and confined in zoos, animals are deprived of a great many goods. For the most 
part they are prevented from gathering their own food, developing their own social 
orders and generally behaving in ways that are natural to them” (1985, p. 97).  
The concept of teleological welfare in animals is closely related to the view of 
perfectionism in human wellbeing (Appleby & Sandøe, 2002). Under this view, the 
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goal of human living is to flourish according to our human nature or essence and a good 
life must necessarily include some objective goods to this end, such as knowledge, 
achievement or social connections (Wall, 2017). 
By contrast, the subjective conception of welfare considers welfare to consist solely 
of the subjective experience of life by the animal – the total of positive and negative 
mental states that may be created by various conditions. The subjective case thus relies 
on the mental states of an animal4. An animal with good welfare is one that experiences 
primarily positive mental states, while an animal with poor welfare is one that 
experiences an excess of negative mental states. Welfare is then the positive experience 
of life by the animal - “the experiential quality of their life, as considered over time” 
(Regan, 1983, p. 96). This view is used by many of the key writers in animal ethics and 
welfare science such as, for example, Singer (1995), Regan (1983), Grandin & Johnson 
(2009), Dawkins (1980), Mellor (2016) and Webster (1994). 
The teleological and subjective conceptions of welfare represent the two most 
common ways of describing what the state of animal welfare consists of – natural 
functioning, or subjective experience. Although these approaches often overlap, they 
do not always, and it is important in these cases that we identify which is the more 
fundamental concern to track. Which one we accept will make a difference not only in 
terms of how we understand welfare, but also in how we measure it, and in what 
conditions we take to be important for creating optimal welfare. The use of the natural 
behaviour criterion relies on the acceptance of a teleological welfare concept; as 
without it, the criterion loses its justification. In the next section, I will look at why we 
should reject the teleological view as natural functioning is neither sufficient nor 
necessary for animal welfare, and thus prefer some other replacement behavioural 
criteria for welfare. 
 
4. Why we should reject teleological welfare 
The teleological conception of welfare relies on a link between natural functioning 
and welfare. In order to accept a teleological conception of welfare, we would therefore 
need to establish that natural functioning is either sufficient for or necessary for welfare. 
 
4 This means that welfare concerns only apply to those animals capable of experiencing mental states 
(sentience). Exactly which animals are sentient is then a matter for empirical investigation. See Jones 
(2013) for an overview on the current state of research in this area 
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However, as I will argue, neither of these conditions hold and we therefore have no 
reason to prefer a teleological view of welfare. 
 
4.1 Natural	functioning	is	not	sufficient	for	welfare	
Teleological considerations and natural functioning are not sufficient for welfare. In 
order to be sufficient, it would need to be the case that naturalness is all that is required 
for welfare. However, there are plenty of cases in which we might have naturalness 
without having welfare. For example, take plants, which are typically thought to lack 
sentience (though see recent work questioning this assumption e.g. Calvo, Sahi, & 
Trewavas, 2017). A plant can be fully natural, but does not have a welfare; something 
more than naturalness is clearly required. Any object is capable of being ‘good of its 
kind’, but we do not wish to describe these in terms of welfare, with the moral 
importance we assign to considerations of welfare or well-being. Although some 
adherents to this view will reply either that we do (or should) have this kind of concern 
about other classes of organisms, or that welfare is insufficient for moral consideration 
(Appleby & Sandøe, 2002), this goes against common usage and intuitions about 
welfare and morality and is not a frequently held view (Duncan,	2002). Thus we require 
something further to determine welfare, to capture why we are concerned with the 
welfare of animals and not plants, which can also have better or worse physical 
functioning.  
This something extra is subjective experience. Indeed, it seems to be subjective 
experience that creates welfare. This is something which is emphasised in the work of 
Dawkins (1988, 1990, 1998) – that animal welfare concerns the subjective experiences 
of animals, in particular their suffering. Fraser (1999) states that “the study of animal 
welfare is at least partly an attempt to understand the animal’s own perceptions of its 
quality of life” (1999, p. 183). It is the states of pleasure or suffering that make animal 
welfare matter. It is why most people would consider it problematic to pull the ear off 
a cat in a way that we don’t when we pull a branch off a tree: “they are aware of how 
they feel and it matters to them” (Webster, 1994, p. 249). Non-sentient organisms may 
have a ‘good’ in a weaker sense, one that could still be considered in moral decision-
making, but sentience provides the strong unique moral claim that grounds welfare. We 
cannot have welfare with teleology alone, without subjective experience.  
We can also see that natural functioning is insufficient for welfare, when considering 
a sentient organism that can be fully natural, yet still have poor welfare, as discussed in 
 12 
Section 2.2. Animals which are experiencing starvation, disease or predation are living 
completely natural lives and yet do not have good welfare, demonstrating that there is 
something else needed, such as positive experience, in order to ensure welfare. 
 
4.2 Natural functioning is not necessary for welfare 
Natural functioning is thus clearly insufficient for describing welfare. Those in 
favour of teleological welfare appear to accept this conclusion, as indicated by the 
inclusion of subjective and sometimes physical welfare within a multi-factor concept. 
Even in the case of human views on perfectionism, it is common to include a component 
of subjective well-being or the pursuit of pleasure on the list of those human capabilities 
necessary for flourishing (Bradford, 2017). However, perhaps natural functioning is 
still a necessary component of welfare; so that we are unable to understand welfare 
without it. It would be necessary for welfare if, in all cases of good welfare, there is the 
presence of naturalness, and if the absence of naturalness leads to poor welfare. In this 
case, we could then instead use a conception of welfare that encompasses at least both 
subjective and teleological aspects, such as the multi-component frameworks described 
earlier (Fraser, 1999; Jones, 2013; Maple & Perdue, 2013). 
Unfortunately, these conditions do not seem to hold. As described, there are many 
cases in which naturalness is present but in which welfare is still poor. By contrast, 
there are plenty of cases in which naturalness is significantly reduced, or absent, but in 
which welfare is still good. Some examples, such as use of technology for enrichment, 
were discussed in Section 2.2. Other examples include husbandry interventions such as 
veterinary treatment, analgesia or reproductive control (Yeates, 2018). A captive 
animal may be unnatural in many ways, yet still having a positive experience of life 
under which it seems odd to claim that it is suffering a compromise in welfare. We 
would require additional evidence that the animal is suffering in the absence of natural 
environments or behavioural expressions (Howell & Cheyne, 2019). 
Arguments in favour of the necessity of teleology, or naturalness, as necessary for 
welfare generally occur in the form of thought experiments, describing cases in which 
we have strong intuitions about welfare when naturalness and subjective welfare come 
apart. We may imagine an animal that meets all the subjective and physical criteria for 
welfare, but that we still wish to say is not experiencing best welfare. Here I will 
describe such a case and provide an alternative explanation for our intuitions about it, 
without the need to appeal to teleological welfare. 
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An example case of this kind is the ‘torpid tiger’5. Tigers can be challenging for zoo 
managers, as they are wide-ranging carnivores that can become frustrated if unable to 
perform roaming, hunting and killing behaviours (Szokalski, Litchfield, & Foster, 
2012). This frequently manifests in pacing, and tigers are often seen moving up and 
down a single fence of their exhibit on what is clearly a well-worn path. Now we 
imagine that one zoo manager, eager to combat this obvious welfare issue in tigers, 
begins a breeding program. They select only the quietest tigers, those that seem to prefer 
sleeping to roaming or hunting. After a few generations, they have created the ‘torpid 
tiger’. This animal shows no desire to hunt or kill, as evidenced by its lack of interest 
in enrichment items designed to channel these behaviours. It does not pace, instead 
choosing to rest and sleep throughout its days, rousing only to eat when necessary.  
It seems this animal has very good subjective welfare – it has what it wants and its 
mental states are all positive (we will also assume here that the animal does not suffer 
any lack of physical condition due to its sedentary lifestyle, that may cause discomfort 
or disease and impact its welfare in this way). And yet, our instinct is that there is 
something wrong with this picture. There is something lost in the ‘tigerness’ of this 
animal. It is less natural, and perhaps does not have ideal welfare. There are two lines 
of response to this case. The first is to deny that there is any real problem with welfare, 
claiming instead that the problem simply lies within our own expectations. The second 
is to identify the lack not within the tiger itself, but in where we set our baseline – by 
what standards we judge the ‘best’ level of subjective welfare. 
In the first instance, it seems entirely possible to refute that there is a welfare problem 
here at all. Perhaps our intuitions are just incorrect. Rather than our feeling of 
‘wrongness’ reflecting any welfare problem with our torpid tiger, it simply reflects our 
own biases - as Rollin (2006) puts it, “a queasiness that is at its root aesthetic” (2006, 
p. 128). We are conditioned to seeing tigers in particular ways, to enjoying certain 
features of them. When we see a tiger that lacks these features, we are disappointed. 
This certainly seems to be the case with the multitude of zoo visitors who constantly 
express their dismay at seeing sleeping animals, apparently unaware that most animals 
– particularly big cats – also spend the majority of their time in the wild sleeping. The 
problem lies not with the welfare of our perfectly content tiger, but simply in our own 
categorisations of what animals should be like. Indeed, it seems that the burden of proof 
 
5 Thanks to Ben Fraser for this example 
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may rest on the shoulders of those who feel troubled, to justify why it is that the 
perceived problem is one of poor tiger welfare, rather than, say, a human concern with 
aesthetics, or the ethics of manipulating tiger lives.  
This response may still be unsatisfying. It does not get to the heart of our feeling that 
there is a problem in welfare – that this animal is not experiencing welfare as high as it 
should be. In response, we need to examine where we set our baseline for welfare. It is 
not enough to simply say that an animal is perfectly content within itself – that it doesn’t 
know any differently. What we really want is a comparison between this animal in its 
current situation and its best possible situation. Although the torpid tiger is not 
experiencing any suffering, and is content with its days of sleeping, there may be a 
range of positive mental states it is lacking, those associated with achieving the goals 
of hunting or killing. Even if the tiger would not choose these activities, it does not 
follow that it would gain no subjective benefit from them – the activities we select are 
not always those which bring us the greatest pleasure. If we simplify welfare into 
something like ‘happiness units’, it could turn out that the number of obtainable units 
for a torpid tiger are not as many as it could otherwise have had if it had been different. 
Activities like sleeping might bring fewer units of happiness, in the form of 
contentment, while other behaviours might bring higher levels of happiness. If as 
discussed earlier, feelings of pleasure are often tied to more strongly fitness-enhancing 
behaviours, a more active tiger is more likely to experience these. The torpid tiger is 
then said to have reduced welfare, not because it is suffering, but because it is not in 
the best possible state it can be in. 
Even if this tiger might be experiencing its best possible welfare in terms of the 
maximum happiness it can obtain, we may think we have harmed its welfare by creating 
it such that it can only obtain this reduced level of happiness. There is a welfare problem 
for our torpid tiger if its experience of subjective welfare is lower than that of a 
traditional tiger that has its needs met. A content torpid tiger may still have better 
welfare than a frustrated traditional tiger. But it does not have welfare as high as a 
content traditional tiger, and thus has in some way been harmed. It is our suspicion that 
this may be the case that leads us to see a welfare problem with our torpid tiger. The 
welfare may be reduced, but what is missing is not any kind of ‘naturalness’, merely 
the potential positive mental states associated with some behaviours. Our intuitions can 
be explained within a framework of subjective welfare, without the need to invoke 
teleology. 
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When thinking about multi-component frameworks for welfare, it is extremely 
unclear just what teleology is supposed to add – if the leading of a natural life adds to 
neither an animal feeling well nor functioning well, it is not obvious what further 
welfare benefit is gained simply through the presence of ‘naturalness’. We may think 
that many natural behaviours will be associated with positive mental states in an animal 
and so add to welfare. However, in this case it is not the concept of naturalness that is 
doing the work. It seems that these accounts only work if welfare is defined to include 
this component of naturalness, but there is no further work done to convince us as to 
why this is useful. It is instead to be taken as fundamental, without further justification 
beyond mere intuition. As the teleological element does no work in determining animal 
welfare, it is thus unnecessary for an understanding of welfare.  
 
4.3 Explaining reasons for the belief 
I have argued that there are good reasons to think natural functioning is neither 
sufficient nor necessary for welfare. What, then, has functioned to justify the inclusion 
of teleological considerations in welfare? This view is still common, and often 
considered intuitive. Here I will examine some other possible assumptions or intuitions 
underlying this belief, and argue that they are unrelated to welfare considerations. 
Identifying the source of the belief, and showing that it does not connect to relevant 
considerations, acts to undermine the belief itself (Kahane, 2011).  
One underlying assumption to this view appears to be that the wild state represents 
the best possible welfare for animals. This is likely to be based in a romanticised view 
of nature - as Dawkins (1980) comments, perhaps “we fall into the trap of thinking that 
a natural life is better simply because it seems more romantic to us from the outside” 
(1980, p. 52). This is a version of the ‘appeal to nature’ fallacy: the mistaken belief that 
because something is natural, it must be good. The fact that the teleological conception 
appears to be most often held by members of the general public lends support to this 
reading, as they will often not have reflected on the concepts. However, this assumption 
is clearly dubious, as there are many examples of animals suffering in the wild. 
Individuals are often physically injured, malnourished, stricken with disease and 
exposed to unfavourable environmental conditions. In a behavioural sense, it is not the 
case that wild animals are free to perform all their natural behaviours. Animals suffering 
from illness or injury will clearly have a more limited behavioural repertoire. 
Additionally, many subordinate animals will be denied the opportunity to access 
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particular food resources, or mates, through competition with conspecifics, or threat 
from predators. Animals in the wild are far less free or happy than is commonly 
assumed.  
Another possible driving force behind the teleological conception of welfare seems 
to be a conflation of welfare with biological fitness (e.g. Barnard & Hurst, 1996). In the 
wild, animals have developed a behavioural repertoire that functions to increase fitness. 
The subjective states of an animal then function as proximate mechanisms to drive 
particular behaviours (e.g. Baxter, 1983; Dawkins, 1998). The idea is that pleasure or 
aversion may be adaptive in encouraging animals to change some aspect of their 
environment – “for example, experiencing the sensation of hunger would inform the 
animal of a nutritional deficit, but by making the sensation unpleasant the animal is 
motivated to compensate for the deficit” (Baxter, 1983, p. 212). In the wild then, those 
states that correspond to welfare are most likely to be those that also correspond to 
biological fitness. In this case, the two types of welfare may correlate – what is best for 
the animal’s functioning may also provide the best subjective welfare experience. In 
the case of captivity, they can come apart: the ultimate needs are met, but the proximate 
mechanisms may still be triggered unnecessarily. Dawkins (1988) draws the distinction 
between real threats to fitness, as may be experienced by the animal, and perceived 
threats to fitness as a captive animal may experience. It is these perceived threats that 
may motivate behaviour, and simply protecting fitness itself will not be enough to 
overcome these drives. Those subjective experiences which have evolved as 
adaptations to promote fitness may be maladaptive in a captive setting. The subjective 
wellbeing of the animal has become separated from its biological fitness. In captivity, 
there is no reason to suppose that fitness is linked to welfare and thus this fails to 
provide support for the teleological view. 
There seem then to be strong reasons for rejecting the teleological view as part of 
our conception of animal welfare, as natural functioning is neither sufficient nor 
necessary for our understanding of welfare. Additionally, the reasons we have for 
accepting such a view may be based in mistaken assumptions about the biology and 
fitness of wild animals, rather than tracking relevant facts about animal welfare. 
 
5. A place for natural behaviour 
I have shown that there is no good reason for accepting a teleological account of 
welfare over a subjective account, or something similar. There is nothing this adds to 
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our understanding of welfare as it matters to the animal. With this in mind, it is clear 
that the criterion of ‘natural behaviour’ does not serve as a useful component of captive 
animal welfare, as it fails to capture what is important about welfare as understood in a 
more subjective sense. Alongside Yeates (2018), “we can dismiss the idea that natural 
behaviour is conceptually part of wellbeing: they are logically independent concepts” 
(2018, p. 5). Instead, we should prefer one of the previously described accounts that 
better tracks the ways in which particular behaviours matter to the animals, such as 
Dawkins’ work on preferences (e.g. Dawkins, 1983, 1988, 1990),Webster’s (2016) 
suggestion of “freedom of [behavioural] choice” (Webster, 2016, p. 4), or Mellor’s 
focus on those behaviours that are enjoyable and promote positive mental states (e.g. 
Mellor, 2016). 
However, this is not to say that considerations of natural behaviour are not useful. 
Studies of natural behaviour certainly have a place in animal welfare. Yeates (2018) 
outlines a number of ways in which study of natural behaviour can assist in 
understanding and improving welfare. Most importantly, this criterion has emphasised 
the importance of particular behavioural needs in considerations of animal welfare. In 
animal husbandry systems where animals that are merely lacking in injury or disease 
are considered to have sufficient welfare, an emphasis on behavioural requirements is 
crucial. Natural behaviour can also function to help us find those behaviours which 
might improve welfare, and to serve as an indicator of good welfare.  
Knowledge of the behaviour of wild counterparts allows us to identify the range of 
behaviours an animal may want to perform and the circumstances under which this may 
occur. This can then be used as the basis for further examination into what specific 
behaviours an animal may suffer in the absence of; which behaviours impact its mental 
states or physical health. For example, Dawkins (1989) analysed the time budgets of 
red junglefowl (Gallus gallus) as a model for domestic fowl (Gallus domesticus). She 
found that even when fed regularly, the junglefowl still spent a lot of time in foraging 
activities, which suggested they might be important, and flagged this as a starting point 
for further testing on domestic fowl. Mellor (2016) suggests that “the natural living 
orientation remains a reference point by which likely untoward consequences of 
imposed environmental and other restrictions can be identified and assessed using 
frameworks that incorporate the two other orientations [physical (biological function) 
and psychological function (affective state)] as integrated elements” (14). If there is no 
physical or psychological detriment to the performance or non-performance of 
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particular behaviours, then there does not seem to be a welfare concern, regardless of 
the naturalness of the behaviour.  
When we have limited access to information about the subjective experiences or 
preferences of an animal, reference to its natural behaviour may be a useful shortcut to 
those things which are likely to matter. Špinka (2006) argues that natural behaviour can 
be a useful criterion for animal welfare as it may be the easiest way of meeting the 
animal’s desired ends, provide positive emotions and have longer-term effects on health 
and welfare that may not be assessed. For example, minks that are allowed the 
opportunity to play in water will later show more play behaviour in their cage (Špinka, 
2006). Veasey et al. (1996b) suggest that, all other things being equal, it is probably 
better for a captive animal to spend its free time performing natural behaviours, and a 
captive animal performing all relevant wild behaviours is probably (but not definitely) 
less likely to be suffering than one that is not. Mellor (2015) rejects a strong link 
between natural behaviour and welfare but argues that “an animal which is fully 
engaged by exploring and food gathering in stimulus-rich environments and by 
interacting pleasantly with other animals in its social group may experience intrinsic, 
deeply embedded feelings of reward” (2015, p. 18) and that “natural living is a helpful 
concept because it points towards the best that such behavioural freedom might achieve 
affectively on behalf of animals” (2015, p. 18). Although natural behaviour may not 
have a direct link to animal welfare; in most cases it will be a strong guide to identifying 
those behaviours which are most likely to matter to the animal, which can then be the 
subject of further study. 
The common theme here is that while many natural behaviours may be conducive 
to, or indicative of, good welfare, what is really important is their impact on the animal 
and the creation of accompanying positive mental states – without these, the behaviour 
serves no real welfare function. Instead of performance of natural behaviour as a 
criterion of welfare, we then need to attend to which aspects of such behaviour may be 
important to welfare. This allows us to focus on the consideration that should be central 
in welfare decisions – what it is that matters to the animals themselves. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that the commonly used criterion of ‘natural behaviour’ 
for animal welfare fails to provide a necessary link to welfare. It is easy to think of 
cases of ‘natural’ behaviour that harm welfare, and cases of ‘unnatural’ behaviour that 
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improve it. The case for naturalness as a component of welfare appears to rest on a 
teleological conception of welfare, that takes welfare to consist, at least in part, of states 
external to the animal, such as ‘naturalness’ or biological fitness. I argued that such a 
conception fails to capture what is important about welfare; relying on natural 
functioning which is neither necessary nor sufficient for understanding or describing 
the state of welfare. Instead, we should prefer something like a subjective conception 
of welfare, in which welfare consists of the experience of life by the animal and those 
factors that affect welfare are simply those which create positive or negative mental 
states. This will lead us to replace the natural behaviour criterion with an alternative 
behavioural criterion, such as preference or enjoyment, that more closely captures what 
matters to animal welfare. 
The welfare of captive animals is the focus of much research and debate. While 
significant progress has been made in the understanding of preferred housing and 
husbandry conditions for captive animals, there is still a long way to go in some areas. 
Work such as this, seeking to find what components of welfare are most important to 
the animal itself, can provide assistance in improving the lives of captive animals and 
encouraging those people involved in animal husbandry to think about what truly are 
the best conditions for the animals in their care. 
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